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ABSTRACT
Online Social Networks (OSN) are increasingly being used
as platform for an effective communication, to engage with
other users, and to create a social worth via number of likes,
followers and shares. Such metrics and crowd-sourced rat-
ings give the OSN user a sense of social reputation which
she tries to maintain and boost to be more influential. Users
artificially bolster their social reputation via black-market web
services. In this work, we identify users which manipulate
their projected follower count using an unsupervised local
neighborhood detection method. We identify a neighborhood
of the user based on a robust set of features which reflect
user similarity in terms of the expected follower count. We
show that follower count estimation using our method has
84.2% accuracy with a low error rate. In addition, we estimate
the follower count of the user under suspicion by finding its
neighborhood drawn from a large random sample of Twit-
ter. We show that our method is highly tolerant to synthetic
manipulation of followers. Using the deviation of predicted
follower count from the displayed count, we are also able to
detect customers with a high precision of 98.62%.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the growing rise of Online Social Networks (OSNs), ser-
vices like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, have emerged as
platform for mass communication, used by various brands,
celebrities, and political parties to engage with users. The
follower count and crowdsourced ratings give the OSN user
a sense of social reputation which she tries to maintain and
boost to be more influential in the network and attract more
following. Various OSNs have a different measure of user fol-
lowing and social reputation, like followers on Twitter and
Instagram, likes on Facebook and ratings on Yelp. However,
these reputation metrics can be manipulated in several ways.
One of the most prevalent methods to alter social reputa-
tion is online black-market services, which help the users to in-
crease their follower/like count. There exist several online ser-
vices from where an OSN user can purchase bulk followers
and likes. The follower black-market services also often have
a collusion network model where a user can gain followers
for free by following other customers of the service. Users
exploit these services to inflate their social media metrics such
as – followers, likes and shares (of the user post) in the hope
to become more influential and popular on the network.
There are several adverse effects of social reputation ma-
nipulation. Crowdsourced manipulation is a big threat to the
credibility of e-commerce networks that rely on user ratings
and reviews for product recommendation and build user trust.
Recently Amazon sued 1,114 sellers on Fiverr – a micro-task
supply driven marketplace, for posting fake reviews of Ama-
zon products [15]. Such marketplaces may also create fake
OSN accounts to be served as followers and likers for their
customers. Infiltration of fake accounts and metrics also has
a damaging effect on the advertisement revenue framework
of OSNs. An advertisement might be shown to certain users
with seemingly high popularity and reputation, but will most
likely not get clicked by the expected number of real users
due to the accounts being fake or bots [7]. Social reputation
manipulation also affects the in-built recommendation ser-
vices of Online Social Networks which are used to enhance
user experience, like – Who-to-Follow recommendation, top
tweets during an event on Twitter, suggested pages and posts
on Facebook and highest pinned boards on Pinterest. Pre-
vious studies have shown that an untrustworthy user (with
bot activity) can have high influence if it has high popularity
(like follower count on Twitter) [2]. Therefore, follower count
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manipulation can have a damaging effect on some popular
social influence metrics like Klout 1 and Twitlyzer 2. These
tools are vulnerable to simple automatic strategies and can
be easily affected by the presence of fake metrics [13]. We
found that 78.3% customers (users with manipulated follower
count) of Twitter follower black-market service in our dataset
have a Klout score greater than 40 (average Klout score). This
shows the implication of manipulation on influence metrics,
and highlight the need of detecting such manipulation.
In this work we study the behavior of customers (Twitter
users) of black-market services that obtain inorganic follow-
ers. While most of the previous studies attempt at finding
the inorganic following behavior and Sybil users responsi-
ble in increase of follower count, we focus on identifying the
users with manipulated follower count and also project an
estimate of real follower count which is tolerant to inorganic
gain of followers. We build a framework based on following
intuitions–
(1) Temporal signatures are hard to manipulate. While
users with manipulated follower count can resemble a legiti-
mate profile very closely, the gain in followers for such users
is often in bursts. Similarly, users with bot tweeting activity
(due to control by black-market they are subscribed to) might
maintain their tweets/follower ratio to evade automatic de-
tection mechanism. However, the bot tweeting activity can be
uncovered by checking the periodicity of time of posts. There-
fore, temporal signatures can be a strong indicator of inorganic
follower gain. (2) Follower count of a user should be similar
to its neighbors. We use several features to identify similar
users from the local neighborhood of the user, sampled from a
large set of random Twitter users. We define neighborhood as
set of users with similar social standing, temporal trace and
social signature. The details of neighborhood detection of a
user is explained in Section 6. We then check the deviation
of follower count of the user from its neighbors to identify
whether it is a customer (with manipulated follower count) or
not. We also project a more realistic follower count for the user
based on its neighborhood which is tolerant to manipulation
and give details of our results in Section 7. In this work, we
present the following contributions
• We extract temporal signatures to identify customers
of black-market services. We show that features re-
flecting the temporal evolution of a user profile are
tolerant to manipulation, and hence good indicators
to find users with manipulated follower count.
• We devise an unsupervised nearest neighbor detec-
tion for Twitter users to discover other similar users
in terms of their social standing. We leverage the
neighbors of a user to find whether the user has a
manipulated follower count or not.
• While most of the studies stop at detecting users with
manipulated follower count, we also estimate the un-
tampered follower count of a user based on its neigh-
bors. This enables us to project a follower count of the
1http://klout.com
2http://www.twitlyzer.com
user which is closer to the untampered value and is
also tolerant to manipulation.
2 BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
Background: There exist several services to gain Twitter
followers which users can subscribe to. These services are
either paid or free. In the paid model, customers can purchase
followers by making a payment to the marketplace. Some of
these marketplaces offer 1000 followers for as cheap as 3 USD.
On the other hand, there also exist a freemium model offered
by these marketplaces which thrives on a collusion network
of followers. The customer needs to give away their Twitter
credentials, or use the third-party app of the marketplace to
subscribe to the freemium services. In this model, customer
gains followers by following other users. In such cases, cus-
tomers become part of the collusion network of followers and
are sometimes also used to advertise about the subscribed
black-market service.
Challenges: The customers subscribed to freemium market-
places and part of collusion network can be hard to identify
because – (1) Due to controlled activity, user properties like fol-
lower/friends ratio and tweets/follower ratio of customers is
manipulated by marketplaces to evade detection, and is very
similar to a random Twitter user, (2) The followers gained by
these customers are often other customers subscribed to the
same service. Hence these followers are real Twitter users
as opposed to bulk accounts created to cater to customers of
paid services. Previous work based on the assumption of bulk
account creation to detect anomalous follower gain by looking
at the creation time of followers is able to detect only 22.3%
customers of freemium marketplaces in our dataset [23], (3)
Although previous studies have labeled freemium customers
as victims and identified them by looking for promotional con-
tent in their tweets [19]; we find less than 30% of freemium
market customers posting advertising content. This could be
due to manual deletion of tweets, or because not all black-
market services use their customers for promotion. Hence,
presence of promotional content can not be a reliable indicator
to detect these customers.
3 RELATED WORK
Detecting Sybil and fake accounts used for manipulation.
Recent studies have shown that the black-market services used
to gain follower/likes create fake identities in bulk to cater
to the customers [14, 27]. These fake identities infiltrate the
social network for various purposes like, manipulating Twit-
ter follower count [6, 21], e-commerce product reviews [12]
or Facebook likes [22]. There have been several efforts made
to identify the entities which cause crowdsourced manipula-
tion. Primarily, research has focused on identifying difference
in characteristics of Sybil and benign entities [3, 11, 25, 26].
Studies have also used unsupervised learning [10, 22] and
trust-propagation techniques to identify Sybils and fake ac-
counts [18, 29, 30]. In this work, instead of detecting specific
Sybil entities, we focus on detecting users which have manip-
ulated follower count.
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Detecting crowdsourced manipulation. While there have
been several efforts done towards finding Sybils and fake
entities, there exist few studies which detect crowdsourced
manipulation, like fake follower count, likes or products with
synthetic reviews. Our focus in this work is to detect such
crowdsourced manipulation, more specifically - Twitter fol-
lower count. Crowdsourced manipulation of discussions in
online forums has been studied in past [9]; and previous work
has explored detection of manipulated e-commerce product
ratings by examining the ratings of a product with other prod-
ucts whose ratings are untampered [8, 28], and uncover crowd-
sourced manipulation in large-scale by the use of temporal
traces [4, 5, 23]. Previous studies based on temporal traces
assume that the crowdsourced manipulation happens in bulk
and by accounts created around the same time [23]. We do
not make any such assumption, because the customers we are
studying belong to a collusion network. Hence, the gained
followers might not be fake users created in bulk by the black-
market, but real users which are part of the collusion network.
We explore other temporal patterns and signals using which
we can identify hard-to-detect customers without making any
assumptions about bulk creation of fake followers.
Defence against manipulation. The current defense mecha-
nism against Sybils and crowdsourced manipulation involves
suspension of accounts [16, 20]. There have been very less
efforts made to estimate the real worth of a user which might
have manipulated follower/like count. There have been at-
tempts in past to measure influence of an OSN user, like using
an influence metric called Klout [17]. While Klout gives high
ranking to an influential and a highly recognizable user, it is
not designed to be tolerant to crowdsourced manipulation of
metrics such as followers and likes. In addition, it does not
give a sense of real follower count of a user. In this work, we
take a step forward in this direction, and predict the follower
count of users using metrics which are tolerant to manipula-
tion.
4 DATA OVERVIEW
In this work, we study users which manipulate their Twitter
follower count by subscribing to free services provided by
black-markets. There exist several Twitter follower market-
places. To collect ground-truth data of users which manipulate
their Twitter follower count, we extract customers of these
markets. We picked top 6 websites based on their availability
of service and their global ranking on Alexa 3. In total we col-
lect 38,791 customer users and call this dataset of customers
Dcust. We notice that a substantial fraction (16%) of the cus-
tomers were subscribed to more than one service. In further
analysis of customers, we compare their behavior with that of
random users on Twitter in Section 5, for which we also collect
127,922 random Twitter users and call this dataset Drand.
To study temporal behavior of users, we collect user infor-
mation of customers and random users after every 6 hours
(total 30 snapshots, spanning across a week 4) and call these
3Alexa. http://www.alexa.com/
4We restrict to one week due to Twitter API rate limit.
datasets Dtempcust and D
temp
rand respectively. Table 1 gives details
of the information we collect for the customers and random
users, which is – (1) temporal profile information of users,
(2) static list of followers and their profile information, (3)
temporal list of friends, (4) most recent 200 tweets (maximum
number of tweets returned in a single API call) of all customers
and random users.
Customer Random
Dtempcust Dcust D
temp
rand Drand
#Users 26,917 38,791 14,788 127,922
#Followers – 24,514,951 – 10,619,990
#Friends 12,064,797 – 43,335,556 –
#Tweets – 4,134,854 – 15,016,287
Table 1: We collect temporal information of a sub-sample
of customers and random users. Dcust and Drand represent
the static data, and Dtempcust and D
temp
rand represent the temporal
trace of customers and random users.
Since the customers of the black-market services which we
collect are subscribed using the freemium model, they are
part of the collusion network where they follow other users
(often controlled by black-market service) in return of follow-
ers. We notice that the customers often unfollow a fraction of
their friends and follow them back, and repeat this activity
several times with a non-unique set of their friends. We call
such behavior unfollow activity. To identify customers which
use black-market services aggressively, we closely monitor
the frequency of unfollow activity by these users. Some users
unfollow their friends as much as 27,038 times with a repeated
unfollow activity within a span of a week as shown in Fig-
ure 1a. We give details of such behavior across the customer
dataset in Section 5. Figure 1b shows the CDF of number of
spikes in unfollow count over time. We use this to identify a
subset consisting of 12,565 customers which exhibit aggres-
sive unfollow activity, that is, unfollow their friends more than
once, and call this dataset Dagg.
(a) Sample user with multiple
unfollow instances (b) Number of unfollow in-
stances by customers
Figure 1: Customers with aggressive unfollow activity
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Figure 2: Static features comparing customers with random
Twitter users. The CDFs show close similarity of customers
and random users with respect to the above features.
5 CUSTOMERS VS. RANDOM USERS
Our goal is to detect follower count manipulation on Twitter.
To achieve this, we first extract features based on temporal and
social signatures which can help identify manipulation. We
perform a thorough comparison of users profiles of customers
of black-market services and a set of random Twitter users.
5.1 Static Feature Analysis
We use Dcust and Drand datasets consisting of 38,791 and
127,922 number of users in customer and random datasets.
We capture the profile information of customers and random
users at the last snapshot of the temporal data collected. We
do not guarantee that a fraction of users in Drand would not
have manipulated their follower count. However, since we
take a random sample of users from Twitter which is substan-
tially larger than the customer dataset, we argue that these
two set of users are inherently different.
As seen in Figure 2, the CDF distributions of static fea-
tures of customers and random users based on follower count,
friends count and tweet count have non-significant difference.
Such proximity in the profile based features in case of black-
market customers and random users shows that the count of
followers, friends and tweets can be easily manipulated by
customers, or controlled by marketplaces to evade detection.
The CDF of follower count in Figure 2a shows that till 125
number of followers, a smaller fraction of random users have
as much followers as customers. However, after crossing the
threshold of 125, a larger fraction of random users have higher
follower count as compared to customers. Since customers of
freemium marketplaces gain followers in small bursts, 125 is
close to the average number of followers gained by customers
per day. This explains why a smaller fraction of random users
have as much followers as customers till this threshold. How-
ever, since the gain in followers in case of freemium customers
is slow, the genuine celebrity users in random dataset of Twit-
ter users have a higher follower count above the 125 threshold
of followers; which explains the upper portion of the CDF.
Similarly, the friends count distributions of customers and
random users in Figure 2b are closely associated.
We notice, that in Figure 2c that the friends count and fol-
lower/friends ratio of the two distributions is almost over-
lapping. We further analyse the difference in the number of
tweets posted and tweet/follower ratio to assess if the the
frequency of content can be used as proxy to user popular-
ity and follower count. However, we find that tweet count,
and CDF of tweet/followers and tweet/friends of customers
and random users is highly overlapping (Figure 2d– 2f). We
also analyse the other static features of the users at a single
time snapshot and find out that 1.72% customers have egg
profiles (profiles with no display image) as compared to 9.2%
egg profiles in random user dataset. Also, we did not find
any significant differences in bio of the two datasets, with an
average bio length of 56.19 characters for customers and 51.39
characters for random users.
This makes the detection of customers a challenging task
and eliminates the possibility of effective detection based only
on the static features. Therefore, we move towards finding
temporal signatures of users based on their tweeting activity,
profile evolution over time, and the trace of their following
behavior in the forthcoming analysis.
5.2 Posting Patterns
We extract the first set of temporal trace for users from their
most recent 200 tweets. Our intuition behind finding temporal
signatures from tweets is that though marketplaces can control
the number of tweets and maintain the ratio with friends and
followers, the time of tweets can reveal anomalous bursts in
tweeting activity after the customer subscribes to the black-
market service.
Analysing Post Content. We assess the content posted by
the customers in comparison to random users. We find that the
fraction of tweets which are retweets of other users is similar
in case of customers and random users with 65% customers
having half of their content as retweet on an average vs 72%
of random users. We also analyse if customers engage more
or less with other users, by looking at the fraction of tweets
which are replies or mention other users (by searching for
@mention tag). Though one may expect customers to be less
engaging with other users, we surprisingly find out that on
an average, customers engage as much as any random Twitter
user. We also find customers using similar number of hashtags
and URLs in their tweets as a random Twitter user. We believe
that such behavior is due to the fact that the customers of
freemium market which we are studying do not exhibit large-
scale bot activity in their tweeting behavior. Instead, these
are real users which engage in manipulation of their follower
count by leveraging collusion network. Therefore we can not
find explicit difference in their posting pattern (as used in
previous studies for bot detection [31]), which proves to be
another challenge to detect such customers.
Analysing Time of Post. To compare how frequently cus-
tomers post as compared to random users, we look at the
mean difference between two consecutive tweets by looking
at past 200 most recent tweets of all users. We find that there is
only a non significant difference in the average time between
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two consecutive posts by customers and random users (Fig-
ure 3a). In addition, we also analyse how many tweets are
posted by the user per day. We find out that in case of random
users and customers, the average gain in tweets is similar.
However, we find difference in the temporal patterns of time
of posts. 33.5% of customers post at least one tweet per day
as compared to only 0.25% of random users as shown in Fig-
ure 3b. Though the average difference in posts of customers is
similar to random users, since the customers might be post-
ing multiple tweets in bursts, the tweet gain per day of the
customers is significantly higher than that of random users.
However, we also find a small fraction of customers deleting
tweets. On further investigation, we found that deleted tweets
were the promotional tweets by black-market services. This
analysis shows that carefully crafted temporal signatures can
be difficult to evade detection and hence can be distinguishing
factor to identify customers of collusion network.
Figure 3: Analysing the time of tweets and tweet gain per
day of customers vs random users
In addition, to assess if the customers exhibit any kind
of bot tweeting activity, we look for periodicity of time of
tweets to find if there are specific time snapshots when the
customers post tweets. We do not find any significant traces
of bot tweeting activity.
5.3 Longitudinal Temporal Analysis
To successfully find difference in behavior of customers we
first collect a week long temporal trace of following activity of
customers and a subset of random users by taking multiple
snapshots of their friends and gain in followers each day.
We use the previously described datasets of Dtempcust and D
temp
rand .
In addition, we take a subset of customers, which is Dagg,
comprising of customers exhibiting aggressive (and repeated)
unfollow activity towards their friends. For this part of study,
we focus on the following aspects – (1) follower gain over time,
(2) unfollow activity – following and unfollowing the same user
repeatedly, (3) friend gain over time.
Temporal Follower Gain: Since the customers manipulate
their follower count by using black-market services, we ex-
pect them to have larger follower gain per day as compared
to random users. Figure 4a shows that there is a significant
difference between the follower gain per day in case of aggres-
sive customers and random users. 80% aggressive customers
have an average of one follower gain per day (or less) as com-
pared to only 0.05 (or less) followers gained per day by same
fraction of random Twitter users. This clearly shows the ab-
normal growth in follower count in case of customers. We also
observe that a 49% customers have a significantly lesser cu-
mulative gain in followers as compared to random users. This
could be because they do not take regular services from the
black-market websites and indulge in follower count manip-
ulation at a small scale only few number of times. However,
for aggressive customers, the follower gain per day is signifi-
cantly different from random users as shown in Figure 4a. We
also notice that about 16.8% customers lose followers. These
could be customers which unsubscribe from black-market ser-
vices and hence start losing followers. A deeper analysis of
these customers showed that they gained less than 50 follow-
ers in span of a week. Since follower gain is a distinguishing
factor, we use average follower gain as one of the metrics to
determine abnormal growth, and to also find out similar users
with respect to their unmanipulated follower count.
Figure 4: Temporal gain in followers and friends for cus-
tomers and random users
Unfollow Activity: We now study the aggressive cus-
tomers in more detail. Aggressive customers are a subset
of customers which repeatedly follow a set of friends which
they have previously unfollowed. To determine aggressive
customers, we cluster the customers based on their time time
series data of how many previously following friends do cus-
tomers unfollow. Figure 5 shows the clustering result of a
sample of 100 randomly picked customers. Based on spectral
time clustering, we get three clusters. The first cluster consists
of customers which do not exhibit any unfollow activity. The
second cluster contains the customers which follow back pre-
viously unfollowed friends only once. And the third cluster in
the figure shows customers which repeatedly unfollow their
friends and follow them back, which we call aggressive cus-
tomers (since they unfollow their friends several times). We
repeat the spectral time clustering over the entire dataset of
customers and find 12,565 users in Dagg, that is, the aggressive
customer dataset. To capture the repeated unfollow activ-
ity, we use previously defined unfollow entropy of a Twitter
user [1], where a larger entropy indicates higher amount of
repeated unfollowing activity. We find that 97.2% customers
have a very high entropy of 0.78, as compared to the average
unfollow entropy of only 0.12 for the random Twitter users.
Temporal Friend Gain: Figure 4b shows that aggressive
customers have a significantly more friend gain that random
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Figure 5: Time series clustering of users with repeated un-
following patterns
users, with 81% customers following at least one new user
every day. This shows that despite unfollowing a large num-
ber of friends, customers gain friends over time at a higher
rate than other Twitter users. One of the possible reasons for
such behavior could be the collusion network of which the
customers in our study are part of. In order to steadily gain
followers, the customers have to follow other users (manu-
ally, or controlled by marketplaces). One of the possibility
towards such behavior is that the marketplace’s third party
app makes the customer unfollow a set of users repeatedly
to maintain the overall friend/follower ration to evade detec-
tion. The second plausible cause of such behavior is that the
customers manually keep unfollowing the users which they
are made to follow by the marketplace’s third party app once
they notice that their account is being used to follow other
users, whose content they are not interested in. This is likely
the reason for 17.7% customers to have a negative follower
gain (as compared to 22% random users).
6 PREDICTING FOLLOWER COUNT
Our follower count prediction methodology is based on the
intuition that users of similar social standing and behavior will
have similar follower count. Now to determine user similarity
which can reflect similar follower count, we define a user
using a multi-dimensional vector of a set of features based on
the deterministic signals we elaborated in the previous section.
Based on these features, we find proximity of the user under
concern with a large sample of random Twitter users to find
its local neighborhood of users. We predict the follower count
of the user by taking mean follower count of the users in it’s
neighborhood.
6.1 Features for User Similarity
We now elaborate the features based on which we define a
user as multi-dimensional vector. We divide our features into
three parts based on previous analysis, viz. static features,
posting behavior and temporal trace. Table 2 lists the details
of features which we use for defining a user. In addition to
the previously described features, we also add the following –
Celebrity user: We determine whether a user is celebrity or
not by first checking if it is verified by Twitter. Next, we look
up Google Knowledge Graph API 5 to determine if the user
has a known Wikipedia page. Either if the user is verified, or
has a Wikipedia page, we consider the user to be a celebrity.
5https://developers.google.com/knowledge-graph/
Static Features Presence of bio, presence of profile pic, num-
ber of tweets, friends count, listed count, is
verified or not, is celebrity or not, topics of in-
terest, topic overlap with followers, favorited
tweet count
Posting Behavior Tweet gain, tweet language, language overlap
with followers
Temporal Features Follower gain, friends gain, spikes in creation
time of followers, spikes in follow time of
followers, unfollow entropy
Table 2: Features used for determining follower count simi-
larity & define user as a multi-dimensional feature vector
This feature helps us to measure the follower count of a user
by taking into account the popularity of that user.
Topics of interest: We extract topics a user is interested in
from the bio of the user. The list of extracted topics can be
effective indicator of similar users with the one for which we
want to predict the follower count. We also determine the
overlap of topics extracted from bio of the user with other
users in the random Twitter dataset to find similar users.
Spikes in creation time and follow time: Customers of freemium
marketplace which we are studying gain followers in short
bursts. These bursts can be captured by determining the
spikes in number of followers gained per day. In addition, a
fraction of the gained followers can be fake and stockpiled
accounts controlled by the black-market operator. Hence, the
creation time of such fake accounts would be similar which we
capture by determining the spikes in the number of followers
created on the same date. Previous studies have shown that
such method can effectively find follower count manipulation
in certain cases [23].
6.2 Follower Count Prediction based on Local
Neighborhood Detection
Algorithm 1 describes the method we use to predict follower
count of a user without taking into account the displayed fol-
lower count on its profile which could be manipulated. To
determine the follower count of a user, we first choose a lo-
cal neighborhood of the user from a large sample of random
Twitter users by determining N-nearest neighbors of the user.
Each user is defined by the feature vector described in the
previous section in Table 2. The N-nearest neighbors are de-
termined by finding the distance between the user vector for
which we want to predict the follower count, and the user
vectors belonging to the random Twitter dataset. We experi-
ment with KDTre and BallTree nearest neighbor algorithms.
We determine the number of relevant neighbors for a user by
taking into account only the users with whom proximity of
the user falls within the first and the last quartile value. Using
inter-quartile range to avoid outliers, is a standard method in
statistics [24]. This ensures that we do not count any outliers
as relevant neighbors for the user. Next, based on these users
we determine the follower count of the user under observa-
tion by taking weighted mean follower count of the neighbors,
where the weight is indirectly proportional to the distance of
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neighbor from the user. Weighted mean reduces the effect
of less similar users and the most proximal users are given a
higher priority to contribute towards the predicted follower
count. Since the neighbors are from a large representative set
of random Twitter users, we argue that the real follower count
of the user should be close to the other users in its proximity.
Algorithm 1 Follower Count (f) Prediction of Twitter user (u)
1: procedure FOLLOWERCOUNT(u, f )
2: u← Feature vector as described in Table 2 for user u
3: R = {r1, r2...rn} . Random Twitter users
4: DistR = {} . Dict. containing distance of ri from u
5: N = {} . Dict. containing neighbors of u
6: for all ri in R do
7: ri ← Feature vector for user ri
8: d(u, ri)← |u− ri | . Distance of u from ri
9: DistR[ri]← d(u, ri)
10: end for
11: RankedDistR← sort(DistR) . Sorted by distance
12: Xl ← LowerQuartile(RankedDistR)
13: Xu ← UpperQuartile(RankedDistR)
14: IQR← Xu - Xl
15: for all ri in RankedDistR do
16: if Xl - 1.5*IQR ≤ RankedDistR[ri] ≤ Xu + 1.5*IQR then
17: N[ri]← RankedDistR[ri]
18: end if
19: end for
20: f = 1|N|
j=1
dj
|N|
i=1
fi
di
. Weighted avg. follower count of neighbors
21: return f . The follower count is f
22: end procedure
6.3 Evaluation of Follower Count Prediction
To determine the effectiveness of our method for determining
the follower count of a user, we collect a dataset of high quality
topic experts on Twitter. Since the customers’ follower count
is manipulated, we can not establish the ground truth of the
correct number of followers for that dataset. However, a
genuine user would not indulge in synthetic manipulation of
its followers, and hence we choose such users which are topic
experts by taking a list of 25 different topics. From this list, we
remove the verified users because such users tend to attract a
huge number of followers which can also be fake. This might
not be a manipulation done by the verified user itself, but
result of the natural phenomena of rich gets richer. Hence, we
collect 500 high quality topic experts for the evaluation of
our follower count prediction. Ideally, the displayed follower
count on the profile of these users should match our predicted
follower count with low error rate. With this assumption, we
perform the evaluation of our follower count prediction.
Using the dataset of 500 topical experts, we first find their
relevant neighborhood. Figure 6a shows the CDF of number
of number of relevant neighbors found for these users. We
notice that 70% users have neighborhood size of 100 or less.
Using these neighbors we next predict the follower count.
Since our follower count prediction can not be perfect and
an exact match to the displayed follower count, we experi-
ment with various tolerance levels, that is the deviation of
Random Customers Controlled
Klout FCP Klout FCP Klout FCP
G1 – 0.13 0.45 0.19 0.32 0.06
G2 – 0.11 0.48 0.12 0.11 0.02
G3 – 0.02 0.39 0.10 0.12 0.03
Table 3: Effect of manipulation on the follower count esti-
mate and Klout score over a period of time. (FCP = using
our follower count prediction method). Computed values
lies between 0.0 (perfect tolerance) and 1.0 (zero tolerance).
The three groups are users divided into buckets with vari-
ous follower counts. G1≤1000, 1000<G2<10000, G3≥10000
predicted follower count from the displayed follower count.
Figure 6b shows the error rate at deviations between ±10 to
±10000 from the displayed follower count. We notice that the
error rate is close to zero when we let the predicted follower
count deviate from the displayed follower count by ±10000.
However, this is not an acceptable tolerance level, and hence
we reduce the tolerance to upto ±100 and report a maximum
error rate of 0.158 ( 84.2% accuracy). This shows that our
follower count prediction method is highly effective.
Figure 6: Evaluation of our follower count prediction for
expert users with unmanipulated follower count
7 FOLLOWER COUNT ESTIMATION AND
CUSTOMER DETECTION
We apply the follower count prediction methodology over a
set of customers and find out the real follower count of these
users. We use the deviation of estimated follower count from
the displayed follower count of users to detect users with
manipulated follower count. We are able to find out 98.62%
customers successfully with a low threshold of 10% deviation
between predicted and displayed follower count.
Since we do not have the ground truth of the real number
of followers of these accounts before they indulged in black-
market services, we choose a different evaluation metric to
assess the effectiveness of our follower prediction method-
ology. We determine the effectiveness of the follower count
prediction methodology by checking its tolerance against ma-
nipulation from black-market services.
For this analysis, we use three datasets. We use the previ-
ously used customer dataset Dcust and set of random users
Drand. In addition, we also create 50 dummy Twitter accounts
and make these take services from freemium black-markets in
our list. We call this dataset Ddummy. We further divide each
dataset into three groups based on its number of followers
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on Twitter – G1 with less than 1000 followers, G2 between
1000 and 10,000 followers and G3 with over 10,000 follow-
ers. We also compare the tolerance of our follower prediction
methodology with a well known influence metric - Klout. Ide-
ally, any influence metric, or our predicted follower count
should not change if a user is synthetically manipulating its
follower count. Therefore, we define our evaluation metric as
the difference between predicted change (in Klout score, or
follower count) and the expected change, divided by the pre-
dicted change. This means, that our evaluation metric would
show a value of 0.0 in case of perfect tolerance (or perfect
prediction of follower count), and a value of 1.0 in case of zero
tolerance. Table 3 shows the effect of manipulation on Klout
score and our predicted follower count. For random data, we
assume that there is no manipulation over time. Since we
do not know the ideal scenario for random users, we do not
report the effect on Klout score. We find that our predicted
follower count for customers does not change much (remains
close to 0.10), though there is a significant jump in the Klout
score of the corresponding customers (average 0.47). We see
that our follower count prediction shows even higher toler-
ance in case of dummy accounts with only a small change in
the predicted follower count (average 0.011), as compared to
high increase in the Klout score of the dummy accounts (0.32
for G1). This shows that unlike other influence metrics, our
method to predict follower count is accurate, and also tolerant
against manipulation by black-market services.
8 CONCLUSION
In this study, we take a step forward towards countering
manipulation of follower count by precisely predicting the
follower count (84.2% accuracy) of Twitter users, and show
that our prediction is tolerant against manipulation to black-
markets. The strength of our method lies in the temporal
signatures we use for neighborhood detection of a user. Since
temporal signatures are hard to manipulate, neighborhood
detection using such features ensures capturing similar users
in the neighborhood. The predicted follower count of a user
is then based on it’s neighborhood drawn out from a large
sample of random Twitter dataset. We conclude our study by
effectively detecting customers (98.62% precision) using our
method, and showing the tolerance of our predicted follower
count against manipulation.
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